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THE CHARITABLE DEDUCTION GAMES: 
CATCHING CHANGE 
Khrista Johnson  
ABSTRACT 
The article addresses a matter that could result in profound changes 
in the ability of the United States to ameliorate the most pressing 
humanitarian and global problems of our times. It provides the 
mechanics and addresses the solutions required to enable U.S. donors 
to do more good. In an efficient market, capital ends up in its most 
productive use. In charitable giving, donations are not always allocated 
to their most effective use due in no small part to current cross-border 
giving laws impeding that result. The article sets forth the concept of 
an “efficient charitable market,” which is predicated upon unshackling 
the hands of the giver. The article proposes a system for implementing 
a new law that would allow U.S. donors to make contributions to non-
U.S. charities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The United Nations (UN) has stated, “Millions still live in extreme 
poverty, yet the world has enough money, resources and technology to 
end poverty.”1 If cross-border charitable giving could perform with the 
efficiencies intrinsic to the private sector, it could have profound 
impacts on the betterment of humankind. Unfortunately, the charitable 
market is not remotely as efficient as the private sector for many 
reasons. However, the main reason from a historic standpoint is that 
U.S. laws do not favor cross-border charitable giving. This problem 
was evaluated in the first article of this series, The Charitable 
Deduction Games: Are the Laws in Your Favor?2 In this article, I 
outline the steps needed to eventually establish what I will refer to as 
an “efficient charitable market” where we are better equipped to ensure 
our collective charitable investment ends up in the hands of charities 
that will put it to its most productive use.3 This end goal of achieving 
an efficient charitable market would allow us to address some of the 
most pressing problems confronting our global society today. 
A.   A Short Definition of Efficient Market and an Explanation of Why 
the Charitable Market Falls Short 
In an efficient market, private sector investors rarely receive returns 
that exceed average market returns given the amount of information—
and fluidity of funds—available at the time of the investment.4 In the 
inefficient charitable market, beating the market is easy: All the private 
investor (i.e., donor) must do is give to a charity that a reputable rating 
organization like GiveWell recommends.5 These charities will 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Get Involved, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/getinvolved.shtml (last 
visited Sept. 23, 2014). 
 2. See generally Khrista Johnson, The Charitable Deductions Game: Are the Laws in Your Favor?, 
5 COLUM. J. TAX L. 69 (2013). 
 3. Id.; see also Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 
25 J. FIN., no. 2, May 1970, at 383–417, for an explanation of the efficient markets theory. 
 4. Fama, supra note 3, at 383. 
 5. Luke Muehlhauser, How Efficient is the Charitable Market?, EFFECTIVE ALTRUISM FORUM (Aug. 
26, 2013), http://www.effective-altruism.com/how-efficient-charitable-market/; see also Farhad Manjoo, 
How to Know if Your Gift to Charity Will Count, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2013, at B8. 
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“achieve far greater returns (in social value) per marginal dollar than 
the average charity [will].”6 In other words, the private investors will 
receive a dramatically better return on their investment, seeing a 
measurable impact, from investing in one of these charities as opposed 
to other nonrecommended charities. This restriction of information, 
together with cross-border giving laws that make it difficult to give to 
non-U.S. charities, highlight inefficiencies of the charitable market 
partially because they show investments often do not end up with the 
charities that will put them to most productive use.7 
B.   Expectations of Philanthropists Today 
At one end of the spectrum, some ponder that we should expect 
charitable markets to be as efficient as the private sector. Eric 
Thurman, Chief Executive Officer of Geneva Global, which provides 
research and grant management for philanthropists internationally, has 
succinctly underscored this point: “Approaching philanthropy as a 
form of investment is an important part of the solution to the problems 
of philanthropy.”8 On an optimistic note, he has found that now more 
than ever “donors are treating their giving like their investments.”9 
Furthermore, Geneva Global has found that the “highest returns on 
investment” result from “local, grassroots organizations rather than big 
national agencies or international non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs).”10 
At the other end of the spectrum is the status quo, where there is 
often little to no concern about the performance of charities.11 Private 
investors frequently contribute to charities without expecting a return 
(in social value) for their investment.12 Similarly, charities are 
unaccustomed to accounting for the productive use of funds invested 
                                                                                                                 
 6. Muehlhauser, supra note 5. 
 7. See generally Johnson, supra note 2. 
 8. Eric Thurman, Performance Philanthropy: Bringing Accountability to Charitable Giving, HARV. 
INT’L REV., Spring 2006, at 18, 19. 
 9. Id. at 18. 
 10. Id. 
 11. KEN STERN, WITH CHARITY FOR ALL: WHY CHARITIES ARE FAILING AND A BETTER WAY TO GIVE 
16 (2013). 
 12. See id. at 15–16. 
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in them.13 Even after being asked to produce reports of effectiveness, 
charities are unable to do so.14 The current market is pushing charities 
away from being the effective providers they need to be for investors 
and for the causes they set out to address: “[M]arket incentives of the 
nonprofit world push charities toward happy anecdote and inspiring 
narrative rather than toward careful planning, research, and evidence-
based investments . . . .”15 
C.   Why? . . . Because the Laws Are Currently Not in Your Favor 
To achieve an efficient charitable market, we must first confront the 
problem in our laws. In charitable giving, investment is not always 
allocated to its most effective use because cross-border giving laws 
impede that result. As explained in the first article in this series, the 
U.S. must change its cross-border giving law to make investing in, or 
giving to non-U.S. charities a sensible option.16 The European Union 
(EU) recently made an equivalent change in 2009 to make cross-border 
giving easier, which shows alternatives are available. Simply stated, 
our current cross-border giving laws make it too difficult, and much 
less effective, for a U.S. private investor to invest in non-U.S. 
charities.17 Now that the problem has been identified, this article turns 
to a viable solution with the end goal of an efficient charitable market 
in mind. 
D.   Catching Change: Identifying Barriers & Bridges to an Efficient 
Charitable Market 
In this article, I identify attendant barriers and bridges to 
establishing an efficient charitable market. Each part of this article 
provides a solution for impediments associated with unshackling the 
                                                                                                                 
 13. Id. at 16. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 14. 
 16. Johnson, supra note 2, at 98–99. 
 17. See Eric M. Zolt, Tax Deductions for Charitable Contributions: Domestic Activities, Foreign 
Activities, or None of the Above, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 361, 392 (2012) (arguing that placing U.S. and foreign 
charities on par with each other would foster having tax subsidies go to the charities that are “the most 
efficient providers of charitable services”). 
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hands of U.S. givers. Part I outlines how the U.S. should determine the 
global goals (i.e., charitable purposes) of non-U.S. charities that are 
allowed U.S. investment (i.e., deductible donations). Part II explains 
the mechanics of a standardized charitable form for non-U.S. charities 
eligible to receive such investment. Part III provides a path for insuring 
that these investments do not land in terrorist hands. Finally, this article 
sets forth a solution for the three main problems associated with 
changing U.S. cross-border giving laws to create an environment 
conducive to an efficient charitable market. 
I.   CHARITABLE PURPOSES OF NON-U.S. CHARITIES 
For an efficient charitable market to exist, the U.S. must change its 
cross-border giving law to allow donations to non-U.S. charities to 
result in a deduction for U.S. donors.18 This has already been 
recognized in the EU, and EU law was changed in a 2009 landmark 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) case, Persche v. Finanzamt 
Lüdenscheid.19 In changing U.S. cross-border giving law, one must 
confront the problem of determining which non-U.S. charities should 
be eligible to receive U.S. deductible donations (eligible non-U.S. 
charities). Opening the floodgates too widely to non-U.S. charities 
would be a mistake. The U.S. must narrow the field of eligible non-
U.S. charities to which U.S. investment may be directed. Specifically, 
one must determine which charitable purposes permit non-U.S. 
charities to qualify as eligible non-U.S. charities. Currently, U.S. 
charities must limit their charitable purposes to those listed in Internal 
Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3) (Code Section 501(c)(3)).20 I propose 
that we identify which charitable purposes reflect internationally 
                                                                                                                 
 18. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 72–73 (explaining that U.S. donors to foreign charitable 
organizations do not receive deductions for charitable contributions to non-U.S. charities under current 
cross-border giving law and discussing the limited alternatives available for such U.S. donors). 
 19. See Case C-318/07, Persche v. Finanzamt Lüdenscheid, 2009 E.C.R. I-359 (directing EU Member 
States to revise their laws to permit deductions for cross-border giving in the EU); see also Sigrid J.C. 
Hemels & Stan A. Stevens, The European Foundation Proposal: A Shift in the EU Tax Treatment of 
Charities?, 21 EC TAX REV. 293 (2012) (stating that the European Union (EU) is continuing to progress 
toward enabling “efficient[] channeling [of] private funds to [charitable purposes] on a cross-border basis 
in the European Union.”). 
 20. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 75 (discussing available charitable purposes). 
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agreed upon, pressing global problems. In this section, I will explore 
how the U.S. may determine what those global problems are, and I 
conclude that the U.S. should restrict the charitable purposes of 
eligible non-U.S. charities to those problems. 
A.   Defining “Good” Globally 
The U.S. should determine the charitable purposes that qualify 
based upon whether they achieve a purpose that is recognized globally 
as an urgent “common unit of good.”21 As one commentator has noted, 
the charitable market is not as efficient as financial markets because 
there is not agreement on what a “common unit of good” means across 
the world.22 In the private sector, the “common unit of good,” whether 
the investor is in the U.S. or in Italy, is an increased return, or money.23 
All financial investors agree upon this matter.24 There has already been 
agreement across the board on what the main problems of our global 
society are today, and priority should be given to addressing those first. 
Moreover, it is highly unlikely that an attempt at establishing an 
efficient charitable market could be accomplished across all sectors in 
its beginning stages. I argue that the United Nations Millennium 
Development Goals (UN MDGs)25 constitute such common units of 
good and provide a framework for determining the answer. 
The UN MDGs serve as an international standard of common units 
of good the U.S. and other nations are seeking to accomplish, and thus, 
they should form the initial body of charitable purposes for eligible 
non-U.S. charities. The UN MDGs are informative in terms of 
                                                                                                                 
 21. See Muehlhauser, supra note 5. 
 22. Brian Tomasik, Comment to Broad Market Efficiency, THE GIVEWELL BLOG (May 4, 2013, 9:32 
PM), http://blog.givewell.org/2013/05/02/broad-market-efficiency/comment-page-1/#comment-542070 
(“Efficiency in the realm of charity is inherently less plausible than in financial markets because in charity 
there [is] not a common unit of what ‘good’ means . . . .”). 
 23. See MILLENNIUMPROJECT, INVESTING IN DEVELOPMENT: A PRACTICAL PLAN TO ACHIEVE THE 
MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS 46–47 (2005), available at http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/
documents/MainReportComplete-lowres.pdf. 
 24. See id. 
 25. Id. at 15, 82–83 (stating the following goals: (1) “[e]radicate extreme poverty and hunger;” 
(2) “[a]chieve universal primary education;” (3) “[p]romote gender equality and empower women;” (4) 
“[r]educe child mortality;” (5) “[i]mprove maternal health,” (6) “[c]ombat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other 
diseases;” (7) “[e]nsure environmental stability;” and (8) “[d]evelop a global partnership for 
development”). 
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considering what the desired common units of good across the global 
landscape are. These eight goals represent “a blueprint agreed to by all 
the world’s countries and all the world’s leading development 
institutions” to confront the most pressing issues of our time, including 
the poverty, hunger, and disease plaguing billions of people as well as 
climate change.26 The target date for achieving these goals is 2015, and 
thus far, progress has been inadequate.27 
B.   Adequate Funding Resources and Inadequate Progress 
Another reason for using the UN MDGs to define the charitable 
purposes of eligible non-U.S. charities is the funding crisis preventing 
the attainment of these goals. In 2002, the UN Secretary-General 
commissioned the Millennium Project, whose purpose was to form an 
action plan for achieving the UN MDGs.28 In 2005, an independent 
advisory body, which renowned economist Professor Jeffrey Sachs 
led, compiled its final recommendations into a report.29 In analyzing 
impediments to private investment in achieving the UN MDGs, 
Professor Sachs stated that private investors need to know that they 
“can earn at least the minimum return they need to invest.”30 Most 
relevantly, he declared that a “key variable[] of interest” to such 
investors is “[f]avorable tax treatment.”31 In other words, the U.S. 
needs to change its U.S. cross-border giving laws with respect to the 
UN MDGs. 
Revising our cross-border giving laws with respect to the UN MDGs 
would allow for an efficient charitable market with respect to pressing 
common units of good. As the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) stated in a 2004 policy brief, it is 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Background: U.N. Millennium Development Goals, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/
bkgd.shtml. 
 27. U.N. Secretary-General, Accelerating Progress Towards the Millennium Development Goals: 
Options for Sustained and Inclusive Growth and Issues for Advancing the United Nations Development 
Agenda Beyond 2015, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/67/257 (Aug. 6, 2012). 
 28. See generally MILLENNIUMPROJECT, http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/ (last visited Oct. 9, 
2014). 
 29. MILLENNIUMPROJECT, supra note 23. 
 30. Id. at 46. 
 31. Id. 
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clear that charitable giving plays an important role in funding the UN 
MDGs, and donations from “both small-scale donors and the super-
rich” are integral.32 A 2003 OECD study revealed that private 
foundations have contributed significantly in several areas, including, 
inter alia, agriculture (the “Green Revolution”) and preventing 
infectious diseases.33 The U.S. leads the OECD countries in terms of 
giving, where private donations have generally measured in at 2% of 
Gross National Product (GNP).34 In 2002, GNP in the U.S. was 
approximately $11 trillion, which means private donations totaled 
$220 billion.35 The UN has recently projected that $30 billion is 
necessary to end the current food crisis.36 However, the numbers have 
not been reflected in the charities’ expenditure numbers. The OECD 
has estimated that the annual expenditures for philanthropic 
organizations total the much smaller sum of $3 billion.37 
An important and pressing question is: Why are charitable 
investments not being used to fund UN MDGs effectively?38 
Implementation of a new cross-border giving law should promote 
giving to non-U.S. charities pursuing UN MDGs.39 This would 
promote an efficient charitable market with respect to the UN MDGs. 
Ultimately, U.S. funding is not being directed toward common units 
of good or resulting in the social value that we and the rest of the world 
have deemed important.40 This is in direct contrast to capital markets 
efficiency where “investment capital is allocated to its most [effective] 
use.”41 By narrowing the areas of charitable work that qualify for a 
deduction (i.e., restricting charitable purposes) to those that constitute 
                                                                                                                 
 32. HELMUT REISEN, INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO FUNDING THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT 
GOALS 15–16 (2004) [hereinafter OECD POLICY BRIEF], available at http://www.oecd.org/development
/pgd/31430478.pdf. 
 33. Philanthropic Foundations and Development Co-operation, 4 DAC J. 73, 89–97 (2003). 
 34. See OECD POLICY BRIEF, supra note 32, at 16. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Andrew Martin & Elisabeth Rosenthal, U.N. Says Food Plan Could Cost $30 Billion a Year, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 4, 2008, at A6. 
 37. OECD POLICY BRIEF, supra note 32, at 16. 
 38. See id. 
 39. See MILLENNIUM PROJECT, supra note 23, at 176–77. 
 40. See Muehlhauser, supra note 5. 
 41. Chicago Ideas: Efficient Markets Theory, UNIV. OF CHI. BOOTH SCH. OF BUS., 
http://www.chicagobooth.edu/ideas/efficientmarket.aspx (last visited Oct. 9, 2014). 
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“common units of good,” the U.S. may make progress in establishing 
an efficient charitable market in the charitable sector where it is needed 
most urgently. This would also mean giving up less control over 
monitoring since there would be fewer non-U.S. charities to consider, 
i.e., only those addressing the UN MDGs. I would urge the U.S. to 
consider changing its cross-border giving laws to promote greater ease 
in giving to non-U.S. charities with a charitable purpose reflective of 
the UN MDGs. 
II.   AN EFFICIENT CHARITABLE FORM FOR NON-US CHARITIES 
In changing its cross-border giving law, the U.S. also must outline 
a standard charitable form, reflective of minimum requirements, for 
eligible non-U.S. charities. The U.S. may be assured that non-U.S. 
charities complying with the form largely are equivalent to U.S. 
charities. The need for a standard charitable form is evidenced in the 
EU’s experience.42 Even after EU law was changed in 2009, many 
obstacles to cross-border giving remain.43 Due to the variation in civil 
and tax laws across the Member States, cross-border giving has been 
made expensive and administratively difficult.44 EU charities have 
continued to incur unreasonable costs and inefficiencies as a result of 
having to seek out legal advice to comply with administrative 
requirements.45 As the European Commission found, this causes 
charities to use valuable resources to meet legal and administrative 
objectives, rather than to achieve their stated charitable purposes and 
may also serve as a disincentive to expanding charitable work.46 In 
other words, these costs and burdens are impediments to an efficient 
charitable market. These same costs and burdens will exist in terms of 
the U.S. cross-border context even after the U.S. revises its relevant 
laws. This section provides a solution. I will consider the standard 
                                                                                                                 
 42. See Hemels & Stevens, supra note 19, at 293. 
 43. Id. at 293–94. 
 44. Id. at 293. 
 45. Press Release, European Comm’n, Proposal for a Regulation on the Statute for a European Found. 
(FE)—Frequently Asked Questions (Feb. 8, 2012) [hereinafter FE Press Release], available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-79_en.htm?locale=fr. 
 46. Id. 
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charitable form that has been proposed in the EU as a viable solution 
and how the U.S. may adapt this form so eligible non-U.S. charities 
can have certainty in knowing they will receive a stamp of approval 
from the U.S., i.e., donations to them will result in a U.S. deduction. 
A.   Using the Newly Proposed European Foundation Statute to 
Produce a Solution 
Three years after the change in EU cross-border giving law marked 
the beginning of a solution to these problems. In February 2012, the 
European Commission set forth a proposal (the Proposal) for a 
European Foundation Statute (FE Statute) that details a standardized 
charitable form, i.e., the European Foundation or Fundatio Europaea 
(FE).47 In sum, the FE is a legal form detailing minimum requirements 
for charities that would be recognized by all EU Member States as able 
to receive deductible donations. 
The purpose of the FE Statute is to facilitate what Persche has 
mandated as law: the ability to engage in cross-border giving across 
the EU with greater ease.48 The Proposal sets forth three distinct 
advantages associated with the FE Statute.49 First, it would cut down 
on costs and uncertainty associated with procuring funds from non-
domestic countries.50 Secondly, it would offer FEs a European stamp 
of approval that would lead to greater legitimacy in the cross-border 
context.51 Third, the tax treatment of an FE would be obvious and 
compelling.52 Enactment of the statute would place FEs on the same 
footing as domestic charities, enabling them to take in donations from 
donors from any participating EU Member State.53 
                                                                                                                 
 47. See id.; Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a European Foundation 
(FE), COM (2012) 35 final (Aug. 2, 2012) [hereinafter Commission Proposal]. 
 48. See FE Press Release, supra note 45, at 2 (“Donors should find donating to foreign foundations 
less costly and simpler. Moreover, the uniform rules and European label connected to the [FE] Statute 
should make European Foundations more trustworthy and recognisable for donors.”). 
 49. See generally id. 
 50. Id. at 2. 
 51. Id. at 3. 
 52. See id. at 6. 
 53. Id. 
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B.   Basic Characterizations of a Standardized Charitable Form 
(European Foundation Statute with U.S. Modifications) 
The following is an examination of the basic characteristics of the 
FE form and an analysis of which provisions should be modified from 
a U.S. standpoint. The definition of an FE is very similar to a private 
foundation or public charity in the U.S.54 As is the case with private 
foundations and public charities in the U.S., FEs may be “grant-
making foundations” and thus fund the charitable activities of others 
in the way U.S. “friends of” organizations do,55 or they may carry out 
charitable activities themselves in a manner similar to U.S. public 
charities.56 Like private foundations and public charities in the U.S., 
private individuals, corporations, or governments may establish FEs.57 
Generally, an FE is a nonmembership organization with a public-
benefit purpose and, in terms of entity characteristics, is private, self-
governing, and non-profit-distributing.58 Commentators have noted 
that it appears to be modeled on the concept of a French foundation 
given the requirement that it has a public-benefit object.59 Notably, it 
differs from a Dutch foundation, which is not required to have a public-
benefit purpose.60 The definition also excludes a United Kingdom 
(U.K.) company limited by shares that is registered as a charity 
because such entity would have share capital.61 In contrast, a U.K. 
company limited by guarantee, registered as a charity would satisfy the 
definition.62 Another term for an FE is a non-profit organization;63 
however, given the restrictions listed above, the term foundation is 
more accurate. 
                                                                                                                 
 54. Compare Commission Proposal, supra note 47, at 6, with Johnson, supra note 2, at 81. 
 55. Compare Commission Proposal, supra note 47, at 17, and Hemels & Stevens, supra note 19, at 
293–294, with Johnson, supra note 2, at 81. 
 56. Compare Commission Proposal, supra note 47, at 15–17, and Hemels & Stevens, supra note 19, 
at 294, with Johnson, supra note 2, at 81. 
 57. See Hemels & Stevens, supra note 19, at 294; I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012); Johnson, supra note 2, at 
81. 
 58. See Hemels & Stevens, supra note 19, at 293. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Johnson, supra note 2, at 95; Hemels & Stevens, supra note 19, at 293. 
 61. Hemels & Stevens, supra note 19, at 293. 
 62. See id. 
 63. See FE Press Release, supra note 45, at 4. 
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An examination of the legal components of the FE is helpful in 
terms of understanding its shortcomings and whether such a form 
would satisfy U.S. standards of what constitutes a charity (to which 
deductible charitable contributions may be made). First, FEs, like U.S. 
charities (i.e., private foundations and public charities), must be 
formed for a purpose deemed charitable under a statute.64 Similar to 
the U.S. statute that defines these purposes for a U.S. charity, Code 
Section 501(c)(3), the Proposal contains a list of allowable charitable 
purposes for an FE.65 
Several of the charitable purposes, or public-benefit purposes, of the 
Proposal are ones that would lend themselves to support from around 
the world or may qualify as common units of good, as explored in Part 
I: specifically, (e) social welfare, including prevention or relief of 
poverty; (f) humanitarian or disaster relief; (m) education and training; 
and (o) health, well-being, and medical care.66 As explained in Part I, 
the U.S. should allow, at least initially, a revision of the law in regard 
to internationally accepted common units of good. The EU also has 
underscored this point in detailing the charitable purposes for which 
an FE may be organized.67 In discussing why cross-border giving 
within the EU should be easier, Internal Market Commissioner Michel 
Barnier isolated a few charitable purposes that he saw as more global 
in nature: “‘We need to support and encourage the valuable work that 
foundations do for European citizens. In particular, we need to remove 
the obstacles which hinder their cross-border work on issues such as 
research, health or culture.’”68 
Eventually, the U.S. would need to consider which charitable 
purposes—in addition to those outlined in the UN MDGs—currently 
detailed in Code Section 501(c)(3) would fall under this category of 
global causes. It would seem obvious that research on preventive 
                                                                                                                 
 64. Id.; see Johnson, supra note 2, at 75 (discussing the requirements of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)). 
 65. Commission Proposal, supra note 47, at 15–16. 
 66. Id. at 15. 
 67. See Hemels & Stevens, supra note 19, at 298–99. 
 68. Press Release, European Commission, Promoting Projects That Benefit Society at Large: The 
European Foundation Statute, (Feb. 8, 2012) [hereinafter Promoting Projects], available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-112_en.htm?locale=fr. 
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treatment or medicine would qualify.69 However, it may be more 
difficult to reach a consensus on the extension of culture.70 Oddly and 
incorrectly, the list of public-benefit purposes does not include 
religion, although religion is deemed a public benefit in all EU 
Member States.71 The first charitable purpose listed in Code Section 
501(c)(3) is a religious one.72 It is imperative to think through which 
charitable purposes would be included from a U.S. perspective.73 The 
European Commission’s failure to provide an interpretation of these 
categories is a shortcoming.74 The absence of a definition leaves too 
much uncertainty for “charities and their donors and for tax authorities 
and supervisory authorities.”75 
Second, the FE must have a cross-border aspect that involves at least 
two Member States in the carrying out of its purpose.76 If this 
requirement applied to the U.S. system, the U.S. would narrow the 
extension of tax deductibility to those non-U.S. charities working on 
charitable purposes carried out in an international context, e.g., the UN 
MDGs. This idea has been explored in Part I. Thus, at least initially, 
the U.S. should consider an even more stringent requirement than the 
FE Statute provides. 
Third, the Proposal details rules that prohibit for-profit activity,77 
akin to U.S. unrelated business income tax (UBIT) rules and a 
minimum capitalization requirement.78 The third requirement subjects 
FEs to a set of rules similar to the UBIT rules that restrict U.S. charities 
from engaging in for-profit activities unrelated to their charitable 
                                                                                                                 
 69. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). 
 70. See Commission Proposal, supra note 47, at 15–16. 
 71. Id. 
 72. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). 
 73. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 74–75. 
 74. See Hemels & Stevens, supra note 19, at 299. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Commission Proposal, supra note 47, at 6, 16. 
 77. Id. at 17. 
 78. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 598: TAX ON UNRELATED BUSINESS INCOME OF 
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 1–2 (2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p598.pdf (explaining a 
charity “is not taxed on its income from an activity substantially related to the charitable, educational, or 
other purpose that is the basis for the organization’s exemption” but it is “subject to tax on its income 
from [an] unrelated . . . business.”). 
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purpose.79 Here, the U.S. naturally would want to extend its UBIT 
requirements to non-U.S. charities to avoid potential economic abuse. 
In terms of capitalization, the Proposal provides that an FE must have 
a minimum amount of assets, specifically 25,000 euro.80 The U.S. 
should consider requiring eligible non-U.S. charities to have a 
minimum amount of assets, perhaps exceeding the FE amount. 
Fourth, FEs are governed by their statutes, i.e., bylaws, and are 
subject to national charity law only in regard to matters the Proposal 
or their bylaws have “not regulated or only partly regulated.”81 Thus, 
national charity law may not limit the activity of an FE beyond what 
is described in the Proposal. However, the governing board of the FE 
is subject not only to the FE’s bylaws but also to national law regarding 
charitable governance.82 Clearly, the U.S. would want to ensure non-
U.S. charities detailed the requirements of charitable governance in 
their bylaws. Perhaps having such non-U.S. charities comply with their 
own nation’s charity law would be sufficient. This would require the 
U.S. to review and approve each nation’s charitable laws, particularly 
anti-terrorist measures, or to rely upon the findings of an international 
supervisory body, which is discussed in Part III.83 In terms of a nation 
like the U.K., that requirement would be easily satisfied. At the same 
time, the U.S. would likely want features of its own U.S. charitable 
law to serve as an additional layer of regulation in terms of such 
governance.84 
The Proposal details three ways to form an FE. Most relevant for 
comparison purposes are the following: (1) “by the merger of public 
benefit purpose entities legally established in one or more Member 
States” or (2) “by the conversion of a national public benefit purpose 
entity legally established in a Member State into the FE.”85 The 
                                                                                                                 
 79. Commission Proposal, supra note 47, at 17; PUBLICATION 598, supra note 78, at 3–7; see also 
Hemels & Stevens, supra note 19, at 298. 
 80. Commission Proposal, supra note 47, at 16. 
 81. See Hemels & Stevens, supra note 19, at 299. 
 82. See generally, Commission Proposal, supra note 47; see also FE Press Release, supra note 45. 
 83. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 84. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 501(m)(1) (2012) (explaining a charitable organization will be denied tax 
exemption if a substantial part of its activities consists of providing commercial-type insurance). 
 85. Commission Proposal, supra note 47, at 6. The third method is via “a testamentary disposition, by 
notarial deed or by a written declaration.” Id. 
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Proposal also provides requirements for the bylaws, such as the 
minimum content they must contain.86 The bylaws must be in writing, 
and there are restrictions on amending them, e.g., only if the purpose 
for which the FE was established has been achieved or cannot be 
achieved or if the current purpose is not “a suitable and effective 
method of using the FE’s assets.”87 Amendment of the bylaws will be 
an area that the U.S. should scrutinize carefully in light of its 
dissolution and private inurement rules.88 The method of altering the 
charitable purpose of the FE seems too relaxed to satisfy U.S. 
charitable standards.89 Under the Proposal, amendment simply 
requires consistency with the “will of the founder.”90 
A pressing issue for the U.S. in revising its cross-border giving laws 
is the presence of oversight by other national regulatory authorities.91 
Specifically, concern about funds being used to support terrorist 
activity is one that cannot be ignored or simplified. This concern is 
addressed in Part III. The idea that a Member State could not provide 
effective fiscal supervision was rejected in a case that preceded 
Persche, Centro di Musicologica Walter Stauffer v. Finanzamt 
München für Körperschaften.92 In Stauffer, the ECJ instead noted that 
a Member State could implement measures to check whether a non-
resident charity was complying with conditions for charitable status 
under its national law, and to monitor how well it was being 
managed.93 A Member State could also require submissions of 
evidence.94 
                                                                                                                 
 86. Commission Proposal, supra note 47, at 21–22. The anti-terrorist provisions that should be 
reflected in the bylaws are explored in Part III. 
 87. Id. at 22. 
 88. See Life Cycle of a Public Charity – Jeopardizing Exemption, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Charities-
&-Non-Profits/Charitable-Organizations/Life-Cycle-of-a-Public-Charity-Jeopardizing-Exemption (last 
updated Mar. 6, 2014) (explaining if a charitable organization is found to operate for the benefit of private 
interests of its founder or shareholders, then it risks losing its tax exempt status). 
 89. Commission Proposal, supra note 47, at § 2, art. 20. 
 90. See Hemels & Stevens, supra note 19, at 299. 
 91. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 83–84. 
 92. Case C-386/04, Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer v. Finanzamt München für Körperschaften, 
2006 E.C.R. I-8204–05. 
 93. Id. at I-8204. 
 94. See id. 
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Under the Proposal, oversight of the FEs is carried out through a 
registration requirement.95 FEs must be registered in a Member State, 
and each Member State must establish a registry that compiles 
information about them.96 FEs not only must register, but also must 
notify the European Commission of such action.97 In addition, the 
respective registries are subject to an information exchange regarding 
FEs, which means they must communicate with each other.98 In terms 
of requirements, the registry does not have to be an independent 
organization.99 Although an existing organization, such as the 
Chamber of Commerce, may serve as the registry, a definitive answer 
has not been provided regarding whether existing tax authorities may 
fulfill this role.100 This requirement may be even more stringent than 
the current system in the U.S. since charities are required to register 
only with an existing tax authority, the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS).101 
In summary, to avoid continued obstacles to cross-border giving in 
spite of a change in the law, the U.S. should provide eligible non-U.S. 
charities with a standardized charitable form. This would provide 
eligible non-U.S. charities with assurance that the U.S. considers them 
to have met minimum requirements. The EU only realized the need for 
a standardized charitable form after changing its cross-border giving 
law. The EU’s Proposal for an FE Statute may serve as guidance for a 
U.S. standardized charitable form, and it may be adapted to U.S. 
concerns. 
                                                                                                                 
 95. Commission Proposal, supra note 47, at 23–26. 
 96. Id. at 23. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 22–25. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Hemels & Stevens, supra note 19, at 300. 
 101. Application for Recognition of Exemption, IRS (last updated July 1, 2014), 
http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Application-for-Recognition-of-Exemption; see also 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PUBLICATION 557: TAX-EXEMPT STATUS FOR YOUR ORGANIZATION 30 
(2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p557.pdf. 
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III.   KEEPING CHARITABLE FUNDS OUT OF THE HANDS OF TERRORISTS 
In this section, I will confront the Achilles’ heel of an argument to 
change U.S. cross-border giving laws, and show that there is a solution 
to ensure unshackled funds are not more likely to end up as terrorist 
financing. An argument has been consistently put forward that we must 
continue to restrict U.S. investment to charities formed in the U.S. 
because we need the IRS’s oversight to ensure funds do not wind up 
in the hands of terrorists.102 That argument is misguided for several 
reasons. First, make no mistake about the present reality: funds 
donated to U.S. charities have ended up and continue to end up as 
terrorist financing.103 The devastating attack on September 11, 2001 
led to the adoption of three mechanisms to ensure charitable funds are 
not used to promote terrorist activities: (1) Executive Order 13224, (2) 
the USA Patriot Act;104 and (3) the 2002 Treasury Department Anti-
Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for US-
Based Charities (Guidelines).105 The Guidelines were designed to 
provide assistance with complying with the two former measures.106 
They were revised and re-published in 2006 (the Revised Guidelines), 
and the net result of the revision still has not led to greater effectiveness 
of the IRS in stopping the diversion of charitable funds to terrorist 
financing.107 In fact, it is questionable whether the IRS is more 
effective than other foreign governmental agencies in preventing the 
diversion of funds to terrorist activities.108 Second, there are 
                                                                                                                 
 102. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 83–84. 
 103. See Nina J. Crimm, Through a Post-September 11 Looking Glass: Assessing the Roles of Federal 
Tax Laws and Tax Policies Applicable to Global Philanthropy by Private Foundations and Their Donors, 
23 VA. TAX REV. 1, 115 (2003). 
 104. Janne G. Gallagher, Grantmaking in an Age of Terrorism: Some Thoughts About Compliance 
Strategies, INT’L DATELINE (Council on Founds., Washington, D.C.), Second Quarter 2004, at 1; see also 
Johnson, supra note 2, at 83 (stating the former, among other restrictions, makes it illegal for any U.S. 
person to engage in a transaction with individuals and organizations named on any terrorism watch lists 
of the U.S. government and the latter increased the purview of criminal prohibitions related to supporting 
terrorist activities and strengthened the penalties for noncompliance). 
 105. Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for U.S.-Based Charities, 71 Fed. 
Reg. 63,838, 63,843 (Oct. 31, 2006). 
 106. See id. at 63,846. 
 107. See Crimm, supra note 103, at 113–115 (describing how U.S. charities have been used to finance 
terrorist activity). 
 108. See id. at 118. 
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international supervisory agencies that have surveyed and continue to 
monitor the effectiveness of countries, including the U.S., in terms of 
their ability to prevent charitable funding from becoming terrorist 
financing,109 and the U.S. can rely on their methodologies and findings 
in deciding which countries’ charitable laws it views and practices it 
views as acceptable. I will examine the extent of diversion of 
charitable funds to terrorist financing in the U.S.; the work of the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in monitoring this issue 
internationally;110 and how the Revised Guidelines may be used in 
tandem with FATF efforts to allay fears about contributions going 
abroad to ultimately create an efficient charitable market.111 In sum, I 
will confront the concerns of implementation from an anti-terrorism 
perspective and ultimately conclude that those concerns may be abated 
with careful consideration and application of the Revised Guidelines 
to the FATF’s current monitoring program. 
A.   Current IRS Monitoring of Charitable Funds 
In arguing that we should restrict tax deductible donations to U.S. 
charities, observers have frequently reasoned that doing otherwise 
would allow charitable funds to escape the careful purview of IRS 
oversight and end up in the hands of terrorists.112 However, this is a 
fallacy because the IRS is not currently doing a sufficient job of 
monitoring U.S. charities, and it is not even entirely to blame. The 
number of charitable organizations in comparison to IRS examiners 
has increased dramatically since the 1990s.113 Relevantly, the 
                                                                                                                 
 109. See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATTING MONEY 
LAUNDERING & THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION, THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS 8 
(2012) [hereinafter FATF RECOMMENDATIONS], available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/
documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf. 
 110. About the FATF: Who We Are, FATF, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/ (last visited Oct. 
14, 2014). 
 111. Id. 
 112. David E. Pozen, Remapping the Charitable Deduction, 39 CONN. L. REV. 531, 545, 596 (2006); 
see Harvey P. Dale, Foreign Charities, 48 TAX LAW. 655, 663 (1995). 
 113. Written Statement of Mark W. Everson, Commissioner of Internal Revenue Before the Committee 
on Finance, United States Senate: Hearing on Exempt Organizations: Enforcement Problems, 
Accomplishments, and Future Direction, Apr. 5, 2005, http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/
doc/metest040505.pdf [hereinafter Everson Statement]. 
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International Committee on Fundraising Organizations (ICFO) 
published a comparative survey in 2002 of its members, which 
includes the U.S. In its report, it noted the following in regard to the 
oversight in the U.S.: 
[B]ecause of the high volume [of reports] only those organizations 
which are exposed by media investigations or are otherwise the 
subject of numerous complaints, get investigated. The same 
limited resource is true of State monitoring agencies. The result is 
a lightly regulated industry brought about in part because of the 
lack of resources to monitor so many organizations, plus the very 
real constitutional protections that are afforded U.S. charities. The 
issues of free speech and separation of Church and State allow 
[charities] considerable latitude in functioning without close 
oversight. 114 
The section of the IRS responsible for such monitoring, the Tax 
Exempt and Government Entities Division (TE/GE), is simply 
overwhelmed with charities.115 Between 1995 and 2003, as the number 
of exempt organization returns grew, the number of enforcement 
personnel conducting oversight decreased in inverse correlation.116 
In 2005, then Commissioner of Internal Revenue Mark Everson 
stated, “In the Tax Exempt and Government Entities Division 
(TE/GE), as in the rest of the IRS, our enforcement presence faded in 
the late 1990’s. . . . [W]e were, and continue to be, struggling with 
yearly increases in the number of applications for tax exemption.”117 
He also elaborated upon the resulting consequences: “This decline in 
enforcement presence, combined with the significant growth of the 
tax-exempt sector . . . created opportunities for noncompliance. We 
simply did not do enough ‘policing’ in the area to support the good 
                                                                                                                 
 114. INGRID-HÉLÈNE GUET, MONITORING FUNDRAISING: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF ICFO 
MEMBERS AND THEIR COUNTRIES 33 (2002), available at http://www.icfo.org/Uploaded_files/
Zelf/survey-formatted.pdf. 
 115. See Everson Statement, supra note 113, at 3. 
 116. See id. at 2–3. 
 117. Id. at 3. 
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actors in their quest to voluntarily comply with the rules.”118 One 
scholar found in 2003 that U.S. taxpayers provided 30% of the support 
terrorist organizations raised in the U.S. through abuse of charities.119 
Alarmingly, in 2007, six years after 9/11, neither the Treasury 
Department,120 the Senate Finance Committee,121 nor the IRS were 
pleased with the current precautions in place.122 Two years after Mark 
Everson’s stirring words, the IRS was still using paper documents and 
the same inadequate watch lists to locate potential terrorist connections 
as indicated in a 2007 Audit (Inspector General Audit) by the Treasury 
Department’s Inspector General for Tax Administration (Inspector 
General).123 The Inspector General urged the IRS to use a more 
“comprehensive terrorist watch list” to ferret out terrorist ties.124 The 
Inspector General did not mince words when analyzing the 
shortcomings of the IRS in terms of oversight of charities: 
[T]he Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is lax in its screening of 
charities for possible terrorist activities. In a recent report (2007-
10-082) the [I]nspector [G]eneral charged that the IRS exempt 
organization office falls short in its efforts to identify and pursue 
cases involving tax-exempt organizations and related individuals 
potentially involved in terrorist-related activities. The report 
emphasizes that this is a significant problem because charities and 
                                                                                                                 
 118. Id. 
 119. Mindy Herzfeld, Restricting the Flow of Funds from U.S. Charities to International Terrorist 
Organizations—A Proposal, 56 TAX LAW. 875, 882 (2003) (approximating a 30% tax rate). 
 120. See generally, TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMIN., No. 2007-10-082, SCREENING 
TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS’ FILING INFORMATION PROVIDES MINIMAL ASSURANCE THAT POTENTIAL 
TERRORIST-RELATED ACTIVITIES ARE IDENTIFIED (2007) [hereinafter INSPECTOR GENERAL AUDIT] 
(noting the deficiencies in the IRS review process for tax-exempt organizations and proposing measures 
to systematically compare forms against terrorist watch lists). 
 121. Press Release, The U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin., Baucus Wants Stronger Scrutiny of Tax-Exempt 
Groups for Terror Ties (May 25, 2007) [hereinafter Baucus], available at 
http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/chairman/release/?id=be60a055-866f-4b60-b6ec-
149865ae03fa. 
 122. Steven Toscher & Chad Nardiello, IRS Scrutiny of Tax-Exempt Organizations, L.A. LAW., October 
2005, at 18–20. 
 123. INSPECTOR GENERAL AUDIT, supra note 120, at 3. 
 124. Id. at 3–8 (indicating that this creates a risk that charities financing terrorism will not be reported 
to the federal government authorities fighting terrorism and explaining the need for use of a more inclusive 
terrorist watch list). 
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nonprofit organization[s] have been an important source of 
alleged terrorist support.125 
Simply stated, the IRS was deemed to have taken inadequate steps 
to prevent terrorist financing. The Inspector General Audit concluded 
that “[t]he use of charities and nonprofit organizations” still provides 
a “significant source of alleged terrorist support.”126 Indeed, the IRS 
itself reflected that the rules it had established were “not well-suited to 
prevent funds from being used to support terrorist activities.”127 The 
IRS terrorist financing prevention process works by comparing 
information on exemption applications (i.e., Form 1023) and 
information returns to the terrorist watch list of the Office of Foreign 
Assets Control (OFAC).128 This process has been criticized as 
“inadequate to meaningfully identify terrorist-related activities by 
charitable organizations.”129 Members of Congress have also observed 
and attested to the inadequacy of the measures the IRS utilizes in terms 
of oversight. Indeed, Max Baucus, when Chair of the Senate Finance 
Committee, stressed the need for Treasury to “step up efforts to 
identify tax-exempt charities and nonprofit organizations with possible 
links to terrorist activities.”130 
B.   International Supervisory Organizations 
If one examines the effectiveness of international supervisory 
organizations, one may conclude that at least one of these 
organizations is performing at the highest level. In this section, I will 
consider the international landscape of global monitoring in general 
and the oversight of the FATF in particular. Such an examination 
shows that the U.S. may rely on the FATF’s regular assessments of 
                                                                                                                 
 125. Alan Rice, IRS Screening of Charities is Lax, 06-07 Pratt’s Anti-Money Laundering Update 5 (June 
2007) (referring to the warning in the Inspector General’s report). 
 126. INSPECTOR GENERAL AUDIT, supra note 120, at 1. 
 127. Toscher & Nardiello, supra note 122, at 20. 
 128. INSPECTOR GENERAL AUDIT, supra note 120, at 4–5. 
 129. Douglas N. Varley, Trends and Developments in Cross-Border Philanthropy: International 
Grantmaking, Social Enterprise, and Stepped-Up Enforcement, in INTERNATIONAL TRUST AND ESTATE 
PLANNING 433, 459 (ALI-ABA Course of Study 2009). 
 130. Baucus, supra note 121. 
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countries’ anti-terrorist financing measures, and thus, the U.S. may 
defer safely to countries that have received a satisfactory FATF rating. 
The FATF’s standards exceed that of the U.S.131 In fact, two of the 
countries the U.S. currently has reciprocity with in terms of charitable 
giving have failed to meet the standards of the FATF and have received 
an FATF rating lower than that of the U.S.132 This finding strengthens 
the argument for the U.S. to rely on FATF ratings in determining 
which countries’ charities would be eligible to receive U.S. tax 
deductible donations. Moreover, as the FATF assessments show, there 
are already more extensive measures in place in other countries,133 and 
the U.S. should have no problem with turning over some of its 
monitoring responsibilities to those FATF-approved countries in the 
name of producing a more efficient charitable market. 
1.   International Landscape of Supervisory Organizations 
The international landscape is full of mechanisms designed to 
ensure that charitable funds do not end up in the hands of terrorists. 
The works of several international bodies have confronted this issue. 
First, the UN adopted an International Convention for the Suppression 
of the Financing of Terrorism that was signed by 185 parties, including 
the U.S.134 Second, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE) has emphasized the need for an international legal 
framework designed to combat terrorism, and it holds workshops 
designed to meet this goal.135 Within the OSCE is the Action Against 
Terrorism Unit,136 which has adopted ministerial statements pertaining 
to decreasing terrorism.137 
                                                                                                                 
 131. See infra Part III.D. 
 132. See infra Part III.E. 
 133. See infra Part III.E. 
 134. G.A. Res. 54/109, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109 (Feb. 25, 2000). 
 135. See Consolidated Reference for OSCE Anti-Terrorism Efforts (last updated March 2014), 
available at http://www.osce.org/secretariat/99765?download=true; see also OSCE Holds Meeting to 
Discuss Preventing Abuse of Non-Profit Organizations for Terrorist Financing, ORGANIZATION FOR 
SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE (Sept. 11, 2009), http://www.osce.org/atu/51301. 
 136. See Consolidated Reference for OSCE Anti-Terrorism Efforts, at 15–18 (last updated March 
2014), available at http://www.osce.org/secretariat/99765?download=true. 
 137. Id. at 11–12. 
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Another relevant presence in the international landscape pertaining 
to the prevention of terrorist financing through charities138 is the 
Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (CGCC). The CGCC 
is a “nonprofit, nonpartisan policy institute” whose aim is to increase 
international collaboration on counterterrorism.139 The CGCC works 
alongside the UN and regional groups, as well as national governments 
and policymakers.140 The CGCC released a report in June 2013 entitled 
“To Protect and Prevent: Outcomes of a Global Dialogue to Counter 
Terrorist Abuse of the Nonprofit Sector.”141 The findings and 
recommendations were the result of collaboration among several 
international organizations, including the FATF (of which the U.S. is 
a member, as discussed more fully below), who participated in a 
multiyear UN project centered around ensuring charities are not 
misused to fund terrorist activities.142 The project consisted of two 
global-level meetings and five regional meetings, and participants in 
the project included over fifty countries, eighty charities, members 
from the UN and multilateral agencies, and representatives from the 
FATF, FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs), and the financial 
sector.143 Their findings and recommendations were compiled into the 
above-mentioned report.144 Notably, the governments of several 
countries were given special recognition for their contribution to the 
endeavor, including the governments of Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.K.145 These countries’ 
involvement should lend additional credence to the ability of their 
                                                                                                                 
 138. Most of the international supervisory organizations use the term non-profit organization (NPO); 
however, the term charity is used throughout this article for consistency. 
 139. About, CENTER ON GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION, https://web.archive.org/web/
20130620021703/http://www.globalct.org/about (last visited Jan. 21, 2015) (accessed by searching for 
globalct.org/about in the Internet Archive index). 
 140. Id. 
 141. CENTER ON GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION, TO PROTECT AND PREVENT: 
OUTCOMES OF A GLOBAL DIALOGUE TO COUNTER TERRORIST ABUSE OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, (2013) 
[hereinafter TO PROTECT AND PREVENT]. 
 142. Id. at 2. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See id. at 2. 
 145. See id. at 4. 
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governments to prevent the diversion of charitable funds to 
terrorism.146 
Two of the recommendations of the report are significant in 
considering the advantages associated with U.S. implementation of a 
more flexible rule. The report found there is a definite need for greater 
capacity building within States and for “a global network of regulators 
and oversight bodies.”147 In terms of the former, better management of 
information concerning charities through mechanisms, such as registry 
databases, is necessary.148 Regarding the latter, the CGCC report found 
that cooperation among national agencies is lacking.149 A network of 
regulators that shares information on procedures and other expertise is 
needed, and could be used to avoid the divergence of charitable funds 
to terrorist activity.150 Additionally, it puts forth the idea of a website 
whereby various countries could share relevant information.151 If the 
U.S. implemented a system where it worked collaboratively with 
another country, such as the U.K., in the endeavor to monitor charities, 
both of these objectives would be met, and it would set a standard for 
the rest of the world in terms of collaboration in the area. However, the 
FATF will serve a crucial role in any system of international 
monitoring. 
2.   The Most Relevant International Supervisory Organization—
the FATF 
Perhaps the most relevant supervisory organization in the 
international arena is the FATF. The FATF is an inter-governmental 
unit that drafts and disseminates policies aimed at safeguarding the 
“global financial system against money laundering, terrorist financing 
and the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”152 
                                                                                                                 
 146. For purposes of this paper, a basic premise is that the U.S. would engage in reciprocity with certain 
EU Member States first, notably the U.K.; this premise is discussed infra p. 40. 
 147. TO PROTECT AND PREVENT, supra note 141, at vi. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id at 13–14. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 14. 
 152. FATF, BEST PRACTICES: COMBATING THE ABUSE OF NON-PROFIT ORGANISATIONS 
(RECOMMENDATION 8) (June 2013) [hereinafter FATF BEST PRACTICES], available at http://www.fatf-
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FATF policies are known as Recommendations, and they are separated 
according to the measures to which they pertain: anti-money 
laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CFT).153 The FATF 
was founded in July 1989 as a result of the Group of Seven (G-7) 
Summit in Paris, which was focused on the prevention of money 
laundering.154 In October 2001, the FATF’s objective was expanded to 
include the prevention of terrorist financing.155 Notably, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) also conducts assessments based 
upon the FATF Recommendations.156 
An examination of the responsibilities and membership 
requirements of the FATF brings its crucial role into sharper focus. 
The primary responsibilities of the FATF are to monitor the 
implementation strategies of members, provide oversight of money 
laundering and terrorist financing regulations, and to encourage the 
enactment and implementation of similar measures in the international 
arena.157 Through working with other international stakeholders, the 
FATF works to cure “national-level vulnerabilities.”158 
The FATF currently has thirty-six members, including the U.S.159 
In addition, the European Commission is a member of the FATF and 
each of the EU Member States are also separate members.160 In order 
to qualify for membership, a country must agree in writing to uphold 
the FATF’s Forty Recommendations and its Nine Special 
Recommendations (collectively the FATF Recommendations) as well 
as the FATF AML/CFT Methodology 2004 (as amended).161 Each 
country also must agree to implement all FATF Recommendations 
                                                                                                                 
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Combating_the_abuse_of_NPOs_Rec8.pdf. 
 153. See id. 
 154. FATF, supra note 110. 
 155. See FATF, FATF IX SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (2001), available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/FATF%20Standards%20-
%20IX%20Special%20Recommendations%20and%20IN%20rc.pdf. 
 156. FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 109, at 8. 
 157. See generally id. (proposing global recommendations to stop terrorists from obtaining funding). 
 158. See FATF, supra note 110. 
 159. Members and Observers, FATF, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/membersandobservers/ 
(last visited Oct. 14, 2014). 
 160. See id. 
 161. Members and Observers, FATF, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/membersandobservers/
membershipprocessandcriteria.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2014). 
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within a reasonable timeframe and to undergo a Mutual Evaluation 
during the process (based on AML/CFT criteria), and periodically after 
becoming a member.162 The FATF then releases a Mutual Evaluation 
Report (MER), which details the member’s degree of compliance with 
the FATF’s Recommendations.163 The current ratings are as follows: 
Compliant, Largely Compliant, Partially Compliant, and Non-
Compliant.164 For purposes of this analysis, a country’s rating under 
Special Recommendation VIII, now Recommendation 8 (R.8)165 is the 
most relevant. The U.S. received a top rating of Compliant in its 2006 
MER166 whereas the U.K. received the rating just below of Largely 
Compliant.167 Later, I will address the rating of the U.S. in comparison 
to that of Canada and Mexico,168 both of whom the U.S. has reciprocity 
with in terms of charitable tax deductions under the terms of a bilateral 
treaty.169 In essence, the FATF serves as an effective arbiter of how 
well a country is monitoring the use of charitable funds to ensure they 
do not end up in the hands of terrorists. 
a.   FATF Rules to Prevent Terrorist Financing Through 
Charities: Recommendation 8 
The FATF rules designed to prevent terrorist financing through 
charities are based on R.8, which is one of the FATF’s Forty-Nine 
                                                                                                                 
 162. See id. 
 163. See, e.g., FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, SUMMARY OF THE THIRD MUTUAL EVALUATION 
REPORT ON ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM: UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 12 (2006) [hereinafter THIRD U.S. MER SUMMARY], available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER%20US%20ES.pdf. 
 164. See id. 
 165. FATF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 152, at 3 n.3; George W. Sutton, The New FATF Standards, 4 
GEO. MASON J. INT’L COM. LAW 68, 87 (2012). 
 166. THIRD U.S. MER SUMMARY, supra note 163, at 16. 
 167. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, THIRD MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT ANTI-MONEY 
LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM: THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT 
BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND 288 (2007) [hereinafter THIRD U.K. MER], available at 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER%20UK%20FULL.pdf. 
 168. See infra Part III.E. 
 169. See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with 
Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Mex., art. 22(2), Sept. 18, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-7 [hereinafter 
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation]; see also Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income 
and on Capital, U.S.-Can., art. XXI(5), Sept. 26, 1980, 1469 U.N.T.S. 189. The U.S. has a similar 
agreement with Israel. Pozen, supra note 112, at 540. 
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Recommendations.170 In fact, the FATF has noted that it drafted R.8 
because countries vary widely in their governmental measures 
designed to monitor the use of charitable funds, e.g., registration 
requirements, reporting, and recordkeeping.171 Terrorist organizations 
have used this lack of structure to infiltrate charitable organizations 
and to divert funds.172 R.8 is an attempt to regulate these procedures 
around the world. R.8 provides that countries should conduct a review 
of the “adequacy of laws and regulations” to ensure charities cannot 
be “misused by terrorist organizations: (i) to pose as legitimate entities; 
(ii) to exploit legitimate entities as conduits for terrorist financing, 
including for the purpose of escaping asset freezing measures; or (iii) 
to conceal or obscure the clandestine diversion of funds intended for 
legitimate purposes, but diverted for terrorist purposes.”173 
b.   FATF Requirements: FATF Best Practices Paper and the 
Interpretive Note to Recommendation 8 
The actions required to comply with R.8 are outlined in the FATF’s 
Best Practices paper on R.8 (the FATF Best Practices Paper);174 in 
addition, the FATF has released an Interpretive Note to clarify the 
Recommendations (Interpretive Note to R.8).175 The FATF’s 
Interpretive Note to R.8 goes on to identify specific measures for 
meeting its objectives.176 Thus, the FATF Best Practices Paper and the 
Interpretive Note to R.8 (together, the FATF Requirements), combined 
with the use of existing terrorist lists, should satisfy the U.S. On a most 
basic level, the Interpretive Note to R.8 instructs countries to conduct 
a review of their charitable sector or to ensure there is another way to 
obtain information on the sector’s “activities, size and other relevant 
features.”177 It also advises countries to use such information to 
                                                                                                                 
 170. FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 109, at 7. 
 171. Id. at 54; see FATF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 152, at 3–4, 5. 
 172. FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 109, at 54. 
 173. See id. at 13, 54. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See id. at 8, 54–58 (the Interpretive Note to R.8 is incorporated in the FATF Recommendations). 
 176. Id. at 54–58 
 177. Id. at 55. 
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determine which charities are particularly vulnerable to terrorist abuse 
and to conduct regular re-assessments.178 
The Interpretive Note section entitled “Measures” goes on to 
elaborate upon four specific actions countries should take in light of 
four areas that form an effective approach to recognizing and avoiding 
terrorist abuse of charities: “(a) outreach to the sector, (b) supervision 
or monitoring, (c) effective investigation and information gathering 
and (d) effective mechanisms for international cooperation.”179 In 
comparing the actions associated with each of these four elements, 
there are numerous similarities with the Treasury Department’s 
Revised Guidelines that confront anti-terrorist financing, as discussed 
later.180 Again, these similarities lend credence to the argument that 
the U.S. should consider accepting the FATF’s rating of a country and 
its sector as valid and reliable. Perhaps of even greater significance are 
the actions associated with the fourth element dealing with 
international co-operation. Members of the FATF agree to maintain 
contact lists and procedures to assist with any other countries’ inquiries 
regarding suspect charities.181 In light of the FATF’s role and diligence 
in ensuring effective monitoring, the U.S. should be able to relinquish 
at least part of its monitoring tasks. 
C.   Fitting It All Together for Implementation in the U.S. 
For purposes of this article, a basic premise is that the U.S. would 
recognize charities formed within certain EU Member States as 
eligible to receive U.S. tax deductible donations. The standardized 
charitable form proposed in the EU reflects a legal form that is easily 
amenable to current U.S. requirements as explained in Part II. The next 
section will show that the FATF requirements, subject to slight 
modification, and FATF ratings of countries provide a way for the U.S. 
to determine which EU countries have evinced acceptable precautions 
for ensuring funds do not end up as terrorist financing. Presumably, 
                                                                                                                 
 178. FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 109, at 55. 
 179. Id. 
 180. See infra Part III.D.3. 
 181. FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 109, at 58. 
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the U.S. could begin with the U.K., given its pursuit of change, the 
current regulatory measures in place, and the FATF assessment of its 
compliance.182 
The actual mechanism to be used should likely be an IRS-approved 
list, as suggested in the first article of this series,183 although alternative 
approaches are feasible.184 If the U.S. consulted the registry the U.K. 
Charity Commission maintains and updated its own registry i.e., 
Exempt Organizations (EO) Select Check,185 in light of an approval 
process, there would be an extra layer of supervision that would occur. 
This would encourage other nations to maintain registries with the 
hopes that other countries would reach similar agreements with them 
and make the charitable sector vastly more transparent. Perhaps over 
time, the U.S. and the U.K. would form a website where charities listed 
on both registries (assuming reciprocity were to occur) could be 
compiled, and information regarding such charities could be subjected 
to even greater scrutiny by donors, thereby promoting efficiency.186 
One point of contention relevant in terms of establishing an efficient 
charitable market is that charities are having to divert too much of their 
investments to complying with anti-terrorist measures; by deferring to 
the international bodies and other regulatory authorities of certain 
carefully chosen countries, the U.S. could reduce some of this cost and 
thereby contribute to greater efficiency overall.187 In looking at not 
only the U.S.’s approach but also that of other countries in preventing 
the use of charitable organizations for terrorist financing, one must 
consider the extent to which greater regulation stifles the ability of 
charities to conduct their given purposes. A working group established 
to discuss revisions to the initial Treasury Department Guidelines and 
comprised of approximately thirty organizations, including private 
foundations, public charities, and religious organizations, and which 
                                                                                                                 
 182. See infra Part III.F. 
 183. Johnson, supra note 2, at 85–86. 
 184. See Zolt, supra note 17, at 393–94. 
 185. EO Select Check, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Exempt-Organizations-
Select-Check (last updated Oct. 6, 2014). 
 186. See, infra Part III, for an exploration of the use of donor-advised funds. See also Johnson, supra 
note 2, at 85–86 (explaining donor-advised funds). 
 187. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 84–85. 
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represented thousands of organizations (the Working Group)188 has 
noted that the cost of complying should be considered.189 In addition, 
Professor Mark Sidel cautions against the negative impact such 
regulations may have and also suggests they might not be entirely 
necessary: “We must be vigilant in observing and ensuring that these 
new forms of regulation do not narrow the freedom of association and 
voluntary sector activities that are so important in some [sic] many 
countries around the world.’’190 A 2010 World Bank report also 
revealed the rarity of charitable funds being diverted to terrorist 
activity. 191 This point reinforces the conclusion that the U.S. should 
consider deferring to the counter-terrorist regimes of other countries in 
the regulation of charitable organizations. The FATF recently revised 
its Recommendations with the aim of not placing stumbling blocks in 
the paths of charities carrying on legitimate activities.192 In the next 
section, I will consider other reasons why, with certain modifications, 
the FATF approach, like the Working Group’s approach, is a well-
suited substitute to relying on the Revised Guidelines. 
D.   Comprehensive Analysis of Rules to Prevent Terrorist Financing 
Through Charities: U.S. Treasury Regulations (Revised Guidelines) 
v. FATF Requirements 
If one considers why the Treasury Guidelines were revised, then it 
becomes clear that the FATF requirements, subject to slight 
modification, should be acceptable to the U.S. One should note that, 
unlike the FATF requirements, the Revised Guidelines are not 
compulsory.193 In this section, I will explain why the Treasury 
Guidelines were revised to argue for U.S. acceptance of slightly 
                                                                                                                 
 188. See id. at 84. 
 189. See id.; see also Sharon P. Light, The Principles of International Charity: An Effective Alternative 
to the Voluntary Guidelines, INT’L DATELINE (Council on Founds., Arlington, Va.) First Quarter 2005, at 
3. 
 190. MARK SIDEL, REGULATION OF THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR: FREEDOM AND SECURITY IN AN ERA OF 
UNCERTAINTY 134 (2010). 
 191. EMILE VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AND THE COMBATTING OF 
TERRORISM FINANCING: A PROPORTIONATE RESPONSE 5, 11–13, 19 (2010). 
 192. FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 109, at 55. 
 193. Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. 63,838, 63,843 & n.1 (Oct. 31, 2006). 
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modified FATF requirements as a suitable substitute. To build upon 
that argument, I will set forth a comprehensive comparison of the 
Revised Guidelines and the FATF requirements and show that they 
are, in fact, similar. I will conclude that if a country subject to the 
FATF requirements, with a satisfactory FATF rating, agrees to the use 
of existing terrorist lists detailed in the Revised Guidelines, the U.S. 
should recognize its charities as able to accept U.S. tax deductible 
donations. 
1.   The Need for a Simple Approach 
If one examines the report of the Working Group compiled in 
response to the 2002 Revised Guidelines, “Principles of International 
Charity” (the Principles), it is clear that a simple approach is what the 
charitable sector feels is the most appropriate response to terrorist 
concerns.194 The FATF’s approach, detailed more fully later,195 
embodies the main tenets of the Principles and the desire to keep its 
standards simple for members. As a result, the FATF requirements, 
subject to the modification explained below, should satisfy the U.S. 
The 2002 Guidelines were revised due in part because they were 
largely viewed as untenable.196 In revising the Guidelines, the Treasury 
Department considered the Principles, which reflected the Working 
Group’s position as representatives of the charitable sector.197 Chief 
among the Working Group’s concerns was simplicity.198 The 
following four tenets were deemed the most important in preventing 
terrorist abuse of U.S. charities in the Principles: (1) charitable 
organizations must only carry out the charitable purposes for which 
they were formed, (2) charitable organizations must meet the 
charitable law standards of the U.S. and the relevant laws of foreign 
                                                                                                                 
 194. TREASURY GUIDELINES WORKING GROUP, COUNCIL ON FOUNDATIONS, PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL CHARITY (2005); see Sharon P. Light, The Principles of International Charity: An 
Effective Alternative to the Voluntary Guidelines, INT’L DATELINE (Council on Founds., Arlington, Va.) 
First Quarter 2005, at 3. One reason for adopting a simple approach is to avoid the overuse of charitable 
funds for compliance. See FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 109, at 54–55. 
 195. FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 109, at 54–58. 
 196. Johnson, supra note 2, at 84. 
 197. Id.; see Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. 63,838, 63,840 (Oct. 31, 2006). 
 198. See Light, supra note 189, at 3. 
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jurisdictions in which they are carrying out their charitable purposes, 
(3) a charitable organization’s compliance with relevant laws is the 
province of the board of directors, and (4) charitable organizations 
must ensure that appropriate steps are taken to ensure that their assets 
are used only for charitable purposes through the use of financial 
controls. 199 
This straightforward approach provides charities with concrete 
direction without overburdening them. In their 2006 Revised 
Guidelines, the Treasury Department agreed with this approach with 
one caveat: Use of existing “lists of suspected or known supporters of 
terrorism” should be advocated.200 
Similar to the Working Group’s report, the FATF requirements 
(embodied in the Interpretive Note to R.8 and the FATF Best Practices 
Paper regarding R.8) utilize a simplified approach. In fact, in its 
Revised Guidelines, the Treasury Department recognized an FATF 
Best Practices Paper as providing guidance on the prevention of abuse 
of charities by terrorist organizations.201 Thus, if the FATF 
requirements are modified to include the use of existing terrorist lists, 
an area the Treasury Department found deficient in terms of the 
Principles,202 they look remarkably similar to the 2006 Revised 
Guidelines. As a result, the U.S. should view the FATF requirements 
as an acceptable substitute. An understanding of the basic purpose and 
principles of the non-compulsory, revised Treasury Guidelines also 
lends support to this position. 
2.   U.S. Treasury Guidelines: Basic Purpose and Principles 
The Revised Guidelines provide non-compulsory safeguards for the 
prevention of terrorist financing,203 and the U.S. could make these 
guidelines compulsory for any non-U.S. charity eligible to collect U.S. 
                                                                                                                 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 5; Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63, 842, 63, 847. 
 201. Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,848. 
 202. See id. at 63,846 n.11, 63,840; Kay Guinane, Summary of 2005 Revisions to U.S. Department of 
the Treasury’s Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, CENTER FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T (Dec. 12, 2005), 
http://dev.ombwatch.org/node/2712. 
 203. Id. at 63,843 n.1. 
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funds as a way to safeguard against terrorist funding. However, this is 
an unnecessary step. As the following survey will show, the FATF 
requirements already reflect much of what is advised.204 Interestingly, 
the Treasury Department notes that its Revised Guidelines are not 
intended to supersede or modify the practices of charities with 
extensive experience in providing international aid and notes that 
many already have implemented “effective internal controls and 
practices that lessen the risk of terrorist financing or abuse.”205 Also, 
the Treasury Department acknowledges that emergency situations, 
specifically catastrophic disasters,206 may mean the Revised 
Guidelines are more difficult to apply in practice; this reality should 
influence which charities are placed on an IRS-approved list.207 One 
purpose of the Revised Guidelines is to increase awareness among 
donors and U.S. charities of the practices charities may put in place to 
decrease the risk that funds end up financing terrorist activity.208 
Another stated purpose of the Revised Guidelines is to assist charities 
with understanding U.S. legal requirements in place to prevent terrorist 
financing, including sanctions programs associated with the Office of 
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).209 
There are four fundamental principles of good practice set forth in 
the Revised Guidelines: 
(1) Charities are required to comply with all laws of the U.S. 
Government, including OFAC-administered sanctions 
programs.210 
                                                                                                                 
 204. See infra Part III.D.3. 
 205. Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,843. 
 206. Id. 
 207. See generally Eric Friedman, Putting Your Charity Dollars Where They Matter Most, L.A. TIMES, 
Jan. 31, 2014, at 19. 
 208. Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,843. 
 209. Id.; see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2012) (prohibiting “material support or resources”); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2339C (2012) (prohibiting financing); see also Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 
63,843 n.2 (detailing complete list of the federal criminal statutes pertaining to terrorist funding). 
 210. See Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,843& n.2 (“OFAC sanctions programs 
include those relating to particular countries or regimes (country-based programs), as well as those relating 
to groups, individuals, or entities engaged in specific activities . . . .”). Presumably, this standard would 
apply according to the home State law of the charity. Note that sanctions programs either forbid certain 
transactions, impose a U.S. block on assets and property, or both. Id. 
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(2) Charities should adopt practices outside of the law to 
ensure assets are used only for charitable purposes or 
other legitimate purposes.211 
(3) Those individuals carrying out fiduciary responsibilities 
on behalf of the charity should evince due care. The 
Guidelines provide that such care should be exercised as 
defined under “applicable common law as well as local, 
state, and federal” law.212 
(4) Every level of the charity and its operations must reflect 
“[g]overnance, fiscal and programmatic responsibility[,] 
and accountability . . . .”213 
These principles inform the more detailed instructions of the Revised 
Guidelines. As apparent from the section below, the FATF 
requirements evince a similar approach.214 Following is a first 
comprehensive comparison of the Revised Guidelines and the FATF 
requirements. It starts with the fourth factor above, accountability and 
transparency, and next turns to two other topics: programmatic 
verification, i.e., preventing improper use of funds, and the 
responsibilities of the governing board. Finally, the comparison 
examines the Revised Guidelines’ anti-terrorist financing provisions, 
i.e., verification of grantees and employees, and the Interpretive Note 
to R.8, which is the overarching document informing the FATF Best 
Practices Paper.215 
3.   Comparison of U.S. Treasury Guidelines with FATF 
Requirements 
Because FATF members must commit to implementing the FATF’s 
requirements and to undergoing regular assessments of their 
compliance,216 the U.S. can rely on the FATF’s monitoring. 
                                                                                                                 
 211. Id. at 63,844. 
 212. Id. Presumably, this standard would apply according to the home State law of the charity. 
 213. Id. 
 214. See infra Part III.D.3. 
 215. See generally FATF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 152 (referring, throughout, to the FATF 
Recommendations Interpretive Note to R.8). 
 216. Id. at 6; FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 109, at 54. 
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Nevertheless, the U.S. should require use of existing terrorist lists in 
the way the Revised Guidelines advocate. In this section, I will set 
forth a comprehensive survey of the Revised Guidelines and the 
provisions of the FATF’s requirements and conclude that they 
surprisingly encompass similar goals and methods. As a result, the 
FATF’s requirements, if modified to include use of existing terrorist 
lists, and the FATF’s ongoing assessment process provide adequate 
oversight. 
a.   Financial Accountability and Transparency 
The methods presented in the FATF Best Practices Paper under 
“Financial Transparency” and the Revised Guidelines under 
“Financial Accountability and Transparency” mirror each other.217 
This lends credence to an argument that the U.S. may rely on FATF 
standards upheld in the FATF Best Practices Paper. The FATF Best 
Practices Paper emphasizes the use of full program budgets that detail 
expenses of the charity and include the identity of recipients as well as 
an explanation of how funds have been used; it also stresses the 
importance of independent auditing in order to retain donor 
confidence.218 The Revised Guidelines provide for a near identical 
requirement, except that a threshold for the audit is included.219 
Specifically, the Revised Guidelines instruct charities to have in the 
place the following: an annual budget that the governing board has 
adopted, approved, and supervised; a board-appointed financial 
auditor responsible for daily control over the charity’s assets; and for 
those charities whose annual gross income exceeds $250,000, an 
annual publicly available audit from a board-selected independent 
certified public accounting firm.220 While the Revised Guidelines 
provide a slightly higher level of detail, overall the general admonition 
to charities is the same. 
                                                                                                                 
 217. Compare FATF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 152, with Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 
Fed. Reg. at 63,844. 
 218. FATF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 152, at 7. 
 219. Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,841. 
 220. Id. at 63,844–45. 
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b.   Receipt and Disbursement of Funds 
The FATF Best Practices Paper includes a subsection on bank 
accounts under the “Financial Transparency” section,221 and the 
Revised Guidelines address this issue under a subsection entitled 
“Receipt and Disbursement of Funds.”222 Although the requirement 
under the FATF Best Practices Paper is much terser, essentially, the 
Revised Guidelines add only two other requirements: (1) compliance 
with generally accepted accounting principles and Code requirements 
and (2) maintenance of a record of salaries.223 Both the FATF and the 
Treasury Department urge charities to make disbursements through 
check or wire transfers rather than cash or currency disbursements.224 
Finally, the Revised Guidelines include parameters for the solicitation 
for funds under this section,225 whereas the FATF Best Practices Paper 
addresses this issue under a separate “Solicitation” section.226 Most 
notably, the Revised Guidelines provide that the charity should state 
its intended goals and purposes for soliciting funds to foster an 
independent conclusion about whether the charity is complying with 
its goals.227 In addition, the Revised Guidelines note that solicitations 
should accurately inform donors of how their donations will be 
spent.228 If a charity decides to expend funds for another purpose, it 
should immediately and publicly disclose that fact.229 Similarly, the 
FATF Best Practices Paper states that charities should identify the 
purposes for which they are soliciting funds and ensure that such funds 
are used for stated purposes.230 
The main difference between the two involves public disclosure. 
The Revised Guidelines are much more insistent upon revealing 
                                                                                                                 
 221. FATF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 152, at 7. 
 222. Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,845. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Compare id., with FATF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 152, at 7 (stating that formal financial 
systems should be used for transactions and encouraging the bringing of charitable accounts within the 
formal banking system). 
 225. Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,845. 
 226. FATF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 152, at 7. 
 227. Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,845. 
 228. Id. (defining final solicitation requirement regarding substantiation of donations). 
 229. Id. 
 230. FATF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 152, at 7. 
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information to the public,231 and the U.S. should require this of non-
U.S. charities.232 Also, the FATF does make its reports of compliance 
public.233 The Revised Guidelines consider various mechanisms for 
public disclosure. Clearly, one of the most crucial mechanisms is the 
annual report requirement. Charities are urged to file an annual report 
that is available to the public.234 The suggested form for the annual 
report is similar to the Form 990 and Form 990-PF that U.S. charities 
are already required to file.235 The Revised Guidelines also advocate 
permitting any member of the public to see the charity’s financial 
statements, including its financial audit upon request.236 The FATF 
Best Practices Paper appears to support this action as well.237 
c.   Programmatic Verification 
Programmatic Verification is a major category for both the FATF 
and the Revised Guidelines. Both use this section to reflect a concern 
for ensuring proper use of and preventing diversion of funds.238 Under 
this heading, the Revised Guidelines contain sub-headings on 
“Supplying Resources,” “Supplying Services,” and “Programmatic 
Review.”239 Under “Supplying Resources,” the Revised Guidelines 
state charities should ensure grantees have the ability to complete the 
goal for which the money was given and to safeguard against the 
resources ending up in the hands of terrorists.240 Secondly, they note a 
                                                                                                                 
 231. Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,845. 
 232. At the same time, one may argue that in an efficient charitable market only providers of sufficient 
information will continue to be funded. See discussion supra pp. 3–4. 
 233. See, e.g., THIRD U.S. MER SUMMARY, supra note 163. 
 234. Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,845. 
 235. Id. (noting that the report should contain a statement of the “charity’s purpose(s), programs, 
activities, tax exempt status, the structure and responsibility of the governing board of the charity, and 
financial information.”); see, e.g., I.R.S. Form 990 (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/f990.pdf. 
 236. See Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,845. 
 237. See FATF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 152, at 6 (“Transparency is in the interest of the donors, 
organisations, and authorities.”). 
 238. Id. at 7; Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,845. 
 239. Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,845. The rules regarding “Supplying 
Resources” and “Programmatic Review” are very similar to the expenditure responsibility rules that 
govern private foundation grants. See Dale, supra note 112, at 680–84. 
 240. Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,842. 
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written agreement should govern the terms of the grant.241 The 
requirement of a written agreement between the grantee and the charity 
is a notable distinction in the Revised Guidelines.242 Finally, the 
Revised Guidelines urge the charity to exercise oversight over the use 
of funds during the term of the grant and to terminate the relationship 
should abuse occur.243 
The FATF Best Practices Paper confronts the same issues through 
asking charities to conduct an assessment using the following four 
direct questions: “Have projects actually been carried out? Are the 
beneficiaries real? Have the intended beneficiaries received the funds 
that were sent for them? Are all funds, assets, and premises accounted 
for?”244 
These questions parallel the Revised Guidelines, which provide that 
grantees should file periodic reports on their operations and disbursed 
funds, and grantees should take reasonable steps to ensure funds are 
not diverted to terrorist activity (of which the charities should be 
advised).245 The Revised Guidelines indicate charities should carry out 
“routine, on-site audits of grantees to the extent reasonable.”246 Again, 
most of these precautions follow logically from the above-mentioned 
questions associated with the “Oversight” section of the FATF Best 
Practices Paper.247 The FATF Best Practices Paper recommends that 
charities conduct direct field examinations as needed to ensure funds 
are being expended for the agreed upon purposes.248 
Inter-government collaboration is a hallmark of the FATF Best 
Practices Paper that the U.S. should adopt. Notably different from the 
Revised Guidelines, the FATF Best Practices Paper identifies the need 
for cooperation between countries when the charity’s home office is in 
a country different from where its charitable work is being performed, 
                                                                                                                 
 241. Id. at 63,845. 
 242. See id. 
 243. Id. The Revised Guidelines also detail similar suggestions regarding “Supplying Services.” Id. 
 244. FATF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 152, at 7–8. 
 245. Compare id., with Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,845. 
 246. Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,845. 
 247. FATF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 152, at 7–8. 
 248. Id. at 8. 
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under the section, “Foreign Operations.”249 The U.S. should also 
encourage collaboration in these instances, as well. Clearly, having 
two countries monitor the effectiveness of charities is preferable from 
many standpoints. 
d.   Responsibilities of the Board 
Both the Revised Guidelines and the FATF Best Practices Paper 
place primary responsibility with preventing terrorism financing, i.e., 
accountability and transparency, with the governing board.250 
Accordingly, each sets forth board requirements,251 and a comparison 
reveals they are remarkably similar. The Revised Guidelines clearly 
state the functions and parameters of the board. The following is a 
summary of the seven requirements: 
(1) Board members should not be involved with the “day-to-
day management” of the charity, and the charity should 
have a conflict of interest policy in place for all board 
members and employees. (The conflict of interest policy 
should delineate procedures applicable if a board member 
or employee has a conflict of interest or a perceived 
conflict of interest in terms of managing or operating the 
charity).252 
(2) The board’s responsibilities are to ensure compliance with 
relevant laws, to maintain the charity’s finances and 
accounting practices through adopting, implementing, and 
overseeing such practices, including financial 
recordkeeping designed to safeguard assets.253 
                                                                                                                 
 249. Id. 
 250. Compare id., with Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,844. 
 251. FATF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 152, at 8–9; Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. 
at 63,844. The Revised Guidelines go on to set forth principles for key employees, defined not only as the 
most highly compensated employees but also as any employees involved in the disbursement of funds. 
Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,844 n.7. The Revised Guidelines state charities 
should maintain a list of their five most highly compensated employees, identifying information for any 
key, non-U.S. employees working abroad, and identifying information, subject to privacy rights, for any 
key employees of subsidiaries or affiliates. Id. at 63,844. 
 252. Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,844. 
 253. Id. 
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(3) The board should keep records of its decisions.254 
(4) A list of the names, salaries, and relevant affiliations of all 
board members should be maintained and made available 
to the public.255 
(5) Within the confines of individual privacy rights, charities 
should have records of certain additional information 
about the board, including their home address, citizenship, 
etc.256 
(6) Subject to the same restriction as above, the charity should 
have the aforementioned information for the boards of any 
subsidiaries or affiliates receiving their charitable 
funds.257 
(7) In the event of being served with process or when there is 
other “appropriate authorization,” the charity should 
deliver records required under the Guidelines to 
regulatory/supervisory and law enforcement authorities 
without delay.258 
Of these requirements, all are reflected in the FATF’s Best Practices 
Paper, except for the first, conflict of interest policy, and the last two, 
subsidiary level application and response to service of process.259 In 
terms of modification of the FATF approach, the U.S. should view it 
as crucial that a conflict of interest policy detailed in the first 
requirement is in place.260 The sixth requirement adds another level of 
scrutiny, which is only suggested in the FATF Best Practices Paper.261 
Finally, requirement seven is also implied, but not expressly provided 
for in the FATF Best Practices Paper.262 Even if a charity only 
complied with the four requirements of the FATF Best Practices Paper, 
                                                                                                                 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,844. 
 259. FATF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 152, at 9. 
 260. Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,844. 
 261. FATF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 152, at 8. 
 262. Id. at 10. 
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plus the conflict of interest policy, there should be sufficient 
precautions in place to prevent the diversion of funds. 
e.   Anti-Terrorist Financing Best Practices 
The last section of the Revised Guidelines, “Anti-Terrorist 
Financing Best Practices,” in addition to the Interpretive Note to R.8 
most closely resembles the course of action suggested. Under 
“Measures,” the Interpretive Note to R.8 details actions FATF 
countries should take to form an effective approach to recognizing and 
avoiding terrorist abuse of charities: “(a) outreach to the sector, (b) 
supervision or monitoring, (c) effective investigation and information 
gathering and (d) effective mechanisms for international 
cooperation.”263 The “supervision or monitoring” measure closely 
shadows, albeit on a more macro level, Part VI of the Revised 
Guidelines on anti-terrorist financing.264 This “supervision or 
monitoring” measure provides: 
[Charities] should follow a “know your beneficiaries and associate 
[charities]” rule, which means that the [charity] should make best 
efforts to confirm the identity, credentials and good standing of 
their beneficiaries and associate [charities]. [Charities] should also 
undertake best efforts to document the identity of their significant 
donors and to respect donor confidentiality.265 
In contrast, the Revised Guidelines detail steps a charity should 
consider undertaking before deciding to make any grants.266 
Importantly, the Revised Guidelines emphasize that all steps are not 
necessary and advocate a risk-based approach, particularly in regard to 
foreign grantees.267 According to the Revised Guidelines, charities 
should consider collecting the following information about grantees: 
                                                                                                                 
 263. FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 109, at 55–56. 
 264. Compare id. at 56–57, with Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,845–46. 
 265. FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 109, at 57. 
 266. Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,845–46. 
 267. Id. at 63,845–46. 
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(1) their name (which seems obvious), language spoken in 
home country, and any acronym or other name the grantee 
uses; 
(2) the relevant jurisdictions where the charity has a physical 
presence; 
(3) historical information that would confirm the grantee’s 
“identity and integrity” such as its place of incorporation; 
its incorporation documents and governing instruments; 
the name of the incorporator and the names of those who 
operate it; and information about its operating history; 
(4) identifying information about the place(s) of business of 
the charity; 
(5) a statement of the general purpose of the charity; 
(6) identifying information for the “individuals, entities, and 
organizations to which the grantee currently provides or 
proposes to provide funding, services, or material support, 
to the extent reasonably discoverable;” 
(7) identifying information for subcontracting organizations 
the grantee uses; 
(8) any “public filings or releases,” including any annual 
reports, essentially those equivalent to the Form 990 or 
Form 990-PF; and 
(9) a list of additional sources of income as well as 
commercial activities.268 
In sum, the Revised Guidelines set forth an overview of the basic 
steps a charity should take to prevent terrorist financing. Additionally, 
the Revised Guidelines offer a procedure for “vetting” grantees.269 The 
Revised Guidelines separate this process into vetting of grantees and 
vetting of the charities’ key employees.270 The main recommendation 
is to “conduct a reasonable search of publicly available information” 
to determine whether there has been any question of a grantee 
engaging in terrorist activity, including terrorist financing.271 
                                                                                                                 
 268. Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,846. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. at 63,486–87. 
 271. Id. 
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Accordingly, the Revised Guidelines state plainly that charities should 
avoid conducting transactions with a grantee where such “terrorist-
related suspicions exist.”272 The Revised Guidelines do not seem to 
add requirements to the Interpretive Note to R.8, but rather merely 
expand upon specific steps that may be taken to “know your [grantees] 
and associate [charities].”273 
Both the FATF Best Practices Paper and the Revised Guidelines 
encourage charities to utilize not only tax authorities but also other law 
enforcement authorities and regulatory authorities in preventing 
terrorist financing.274 The FATF Best Practices Paper advocates 
drawing upon the expertise of the financial sector in investigating 
possible terrorist connections.275 Information sharing among such 
bodies is encouraged in both as well.276 The FATF Best Practices 
Paper also states that private watchdog organizations may prove 
beneficial,277 which is a resource that should play a larger role in the 
U.S. monitoring and perceived monitoring assessment of other 
countries. 278 
In contrast to the FATF requirements, the Revised Guidelines 
identify specific U.S. lists that should be used to gather information 
about grantees.279 The U.S. should require any non-U.S. charity to 
attest to verifying grantees against these lists, as well, especially where 
other UN Member States are involved. First, in terms of the lists that 
should be used in conducting the search, the Revised Guidelines 
recommend the Terrorist Exclusion List (TEL).280 The TEL is a result 
                                                                                                                 
 272. Id. at 63,847. 
 273. FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 109, at 57. 
 274. Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,844; FATF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 
152, at 9, 10. These concerns are also described in the Interpretive Note to R.8 under the measure on 
effective information gathering and investigation. FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 109, at 57–58. 
 275. FATF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 152, at 10–11. 
 276. See FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 109, at 57; see Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 
71 Fed. Reg. at 63,847. 
 277. FATF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 152, at 11. 
 278. Current private sector monitors of U.S. charities include Guidestar, Council on Foundations, and 
The National Council on Charitable Statistics. See About, NCCS, nccs.urban.org/about/index.cfm (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2014). Cf. Gallagher, supra note 104 (recommending Guidestar’s donor list as a method 
to validate grantees). 
 279. Compare Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,846, with FATF BEST 
PRACTICES, supra note 152, at 11. 
 280. Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,846 n.11. 
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of the Patriot Act and permits the Secretary of State to include groups 
after consulting with or at the request of the Attorney General.281 The 
notes to the Revised Guidelines explain that there is an overlap 
between the list of Specially Designated Nationals that OFAC 
maintains (the SDN List) and the TEL, but in comparison, the SDN 
list is under inclusive.282 Second, even though the SDN list is under 
inclusive, the Revised Guidelines advise charities to check that a given 
grantee is not on the OFAC SDN list and has not been sanctioned by 
OFAC.283 Since the SDN List is available in different formats, 
charities will be able to search grantees easily according to “program, 
by country of residency, individuals vs. entities,” etc. in conducting 
risk-based research.284 Third, charities are urged to ensure that key 
employees, board members, and “other senior management at a 
grantee’s principal place of business, and for key employees at . . . 
other business locations” 285 are fully identified and that such 
individuals are not subject to OFAC sanctions.286 Fourth, charities 
should consult other countries’ equivalent of these lists of “designated 
terrorist-related individuals, entities, or organizations” that are 
maintained in compliance with the United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1373 (2001) (UNSCR 1373).287 UNSCR 1373 was adopted 
on September 28, 2001 and directs UN Member States to implement 
measures to prevent terrorism.288 Most relevantly, the UN Member 
                                                                                                                 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. The notes specify that U.S. persons may not provide services or conduct transactions with 
individuals designated on this list and stating that a block has been entered on their assets. Id. at 63,846 
n.12. 
 283. Id. at 63,846 & n.11. 
 284. See id. at 63,846 n.12. 
 285. Id. at 63,846. 
 286. See Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,846–47 (stating that full identification 
means their full name in English, native language, any acronym or aliases used, nationality, citizenship, 
residence country, and birth date and location). 
 287. Id. at 63,847. Pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) (UNSCR 
1373), UN Member States must freeze the funds and assets of any persons providing financial assistance 
or other support to “terrorist activity or terrorist-related individuals, entities, or organizations” and stating 
UN Member States must maintain a list of sanctioned parties. Id. at 63,847 n.14 (citing S.C. Res. 1373, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001)). 
 288. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
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States are called upon to criminalize acts of terrorism and to “work 
together . . . to prevent and suppress terrorist acts.”289 
The Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) 
monitors compliance with UNSCR 1373290 and UNSCR 1624 (2005), 
a second resolution designed to criminalize the incitement of acts of 
terrorism.291 As part of its efforts, the CTC requested that each country 
submit a report on the measures it has taken to prevent terrorism.292 
Experts have commented that the CTC maintains “the world’s largest 
body of information on the counter-terrorism capacity of each of the 
192 UN Member States.”293 Interestingly, one of the reasons the 
Revised Guidelines encourage charities operating abroad to consider 
using the foreign UNSCR 1373 lists as part of “additional 
precautionary measures” is because doing so could help prevent the 
charity from being subject to sanctions or other penalties for failing to 
comply with foreign law.294 Additionally, the Revised Guidelines 
recommend checking the board and key employees of foreign grantees 
against this list as an additional safeguard measure.295 Foreign 
countries part of the UN will seek to impose sanctions on any 
individual, entity, or organization participating in terrorist support or 
financing.296 
Additionally, with regard to the grantee and its individual members 
(i.e., key employees, board members, and other senior management), 
charities should consult “publicly available information” to determine 
whether they are “reasonably suspected” of terrorist activity, including 
funding.297 Finally, a pre-requisite for any grantee receiving funding 
from a charity should be a signed certification that it has complied with 
                                                                                                                 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. 
 291. S.C. Res. 1624, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1624 (Sept. 14, 2005). 
 292. See id.¶ 5. 
 293. Country Reports, SECURITY COUNCIL COUNTER-TERRORISM COMMITTEE, 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/resources/countryreports.html (last updated Jan. 30, 2012); see DAVID 
CORTRIGHT, A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE UN COUNTER-TERRORISM PROGRAM: 
ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND CHALLENGES 5 & n.12 (2005) (describing the number of reports submitted by 
member states and their effect on the CTC’s knowledge of counter-terrorism efforts). 
 294. Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,847 n.14. 
 295. Id. at 63,847. 
 296. See id. 
 297. Id. 
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all U.S. laws that prohibit U.S. persons from conducting affairs with 
any individual, entities, or organizations upon which OFAC sanctions 
have been imposed or with foreign grantees, that they do not conduct 
transactions with known terrorist supporters or violators of OFAC 
sanctions.298 
In terms of vetting its own key employees, charities are advised to 
take similar steps.299 Again, a “reasonable search of publicly available 
information” for key employees and potential employees should be 
conducted to ensure a lack of participation with terrorist activity or 
support.300 Likewise, the charity should ensure that its key employees 
have not been assessed or have infringed OFAC sanctions.301 The 
Revised Guidelines detail the proper responses in the event the charity 
finds any of its own key employees, board members, senior 
management, or those of its grantees or the grantees themselves have 
a questionable tie to terrorist activity, including funding or support.302 
If the charity finds any of the above mentioned parties on the SDN 
List, it should exercise due diligence in accordance with the procedures 
set forth on the OFAC website.303 If the charity does not find a 
connection on the SDN List but finds questionable terrorist activity, it 
should report this information through a referral form that is accessible 
on the Treasury Department’s website.304 Also, this information may 
be reported to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) local field 
offices.305 Accordingly, the U.S. should require any eligible non-U.S. 
charity to report such findings not only to the FBI but also to its 
governmental authorities.306 The point is not only to prevent diversion 
of funds but also to ensure reporting to relevant authorities. 
                                                                                                                 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. 
 300. See Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. at 63,847. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. 
 306. Cf. FATF BEST PRACTICES, supra note 152, at 5, 9–10 (encouraging transparency and cooperation 
between charities and their appropriate governing bodies, as well as accountability of charities to the 
appropriate authorities). 
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In comparing the methods of the FATF requirements with the 
Revised Guidelines, there are numerous similarities. These 
commonalities lend credence to the argument that the U.S. should 
accept the FATF’s rating of a country’s charitable oversight under R.8 
as valid and reliable. Perhaps of even greater significance are the 
actions associated with the fourth element, i.e., international co-
operation. In light of the FATF’s role and diligence in ensuring 
effective monitoring, the U.S. should be able to relinquish at least part 
of its monitoring tasks, subject to certain modifications, particularly 
the use of lists in vetting grantees. 
E.   Current Inconsistent U.S. Stance 
One of the most disturbing aspects of the current regulation is that 
the U.S. allows donors to make tax deductible contributions to 
charities in other countries through bilateral treaty provisions, despite 
their low FATF ratings.307 This section will involve an examination of 
two of the three countries the U.S. has entered into bilateral treaties 
with that allow U.S. deductions for contributions to their charities. 
Under Article XXI(5) of the U.S.-Canada Income Tax Treaty, a U.S. 
citizen or resident may receive a U.S. tax deduction for a donation to 
certain Canadian charities that are (1) treated essentially as a charity in 
Canada and (2) would be treated as a charity if formed in the U.S. 308 
A similar provision applies under Article 22(2) of the U.S.-Mexico 
Income Tax Treaty.309 Both Canada and Mexico have received 
unsatisfactory MERs in regard to R.8.310 They are falling short of other 
countries, such as the U.K., in terms of anti-terrorist financing 
prevention.311 The U.S. should allow charities formed in other 
                                                                                                                 
 307. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 308. Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, supra note 169. 
 309. See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, supra note 169. 
 310. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, THIRD MUTUAL EVALUATION ON ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING 
AND COMBATTING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM-CANADA 254–59, 300 (2008) [hereinafter THIRD 
CANADA MER], available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER%20
Canada%20full.pdf; FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, MUTUAL EVALUATION ON ANTI-MONEY 
LAUNDERING AND COMBATTING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM-MEXICO 261–62, 324 (2008) 
[hereinafter MEXICO MER], available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/
MER%20Mexico%20ful.pdf. 
 311. Compare THIRD CANADA MER, supra note 310, at 300, and MEXICO MER, supra note 310, at 
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countries (that have more favorable FATF ratings) to enjoy the same 
treatment as these less FATF compliant countries. The U.S. should 
adopt a more logical standpoint and rely on FATF assessments in 
allowing U.S. donors more flexibility in investing abroad. 
1.   FATF Rating of Canada 
As mentioned above, under the terms of the U.S.-Canada Treaty, a 
U.S. donor may receive a tax deduction for a contribution to certain 
Canadian charities.312 Nevertheless, in its 2008 MER, Canada was 
found to be only Largely Compliant with Recommendation 8 
(formerly SR.VIII).313 The report noted this rating was based on 
Canada’s failure to put in place “co-ordination mechanisms between 
competent authorities, especially between the [Canada Revenue 
Agency] and the parties responsible for listing and freezing 
applications.”314 This failure and its effect on this ranking meant that 
Canada was not taking sufficient precautions against the risk of 
terrorist financing through its nonprofit sector.315 Even after six 
follow-up MERs, it does not appear that Canada has revised its laws 
in a manner that takes account of this concern.316 
2.   FATF Rating of Mexico 
Similarly, Mexico’s 2008 MER stated it had failed to meet the basic 
requirement of R.8 (formerly SR. VIII): to conduct a review of its laws 
and regulations governing nonprofit organizations to determine their 
adequacy in respect to preventing terrorist financing.317 Moreover, it 
did not have mechanisms in place to obtain information regarding its 
nonprofit sector or their “activities, size[,] and other relevant features” 
                                                                                                                 
324, with THIRD U.K. MER, supra note 167, at 288. Although the U.K. was given the same ranking as 
Canada, the U.K. was deficient only within Northern Ireland, as explained infra Part III.F. 
 312. Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, supra note 169. 
 313. THIRD CANADA MER, supra note 310, at 259, 300. 
 314. Id. at 259. 
 315. See id. 
 316. See FATF, SIXTH FOLLOW-UP REPORT MUTUAL EVALUATION OF CANADA (2014) (commenting 
on Canada’s updated laws to achieve compliance without mention of R.8), available at www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/met/FUR-Canada-2014.pdf. 
 317. See THIRD MEXICO MER, supra note 310, at 256, 261–62. 
49
: The Charitable Deduction Games: Catching Change
Published by Reading Room, 2015
338 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:2 
to better understand which organizations were likely to be at risk for a 
misdirection of funds to terrorist activity.318 Overall, Mexico received 
a rating of Partially Compliant, which is lower than the ratings of both 
the U.S. and Canada.319 The other deficiencies recorded in Mexico’s 
report include the following: (1) the failure to raise awareness or to 
suggest precautions to prevent charitable funds from being used as 
terrorist financing, and (2) the failure to put in place investigative 
measures to make a determination of charities which either are being 
misused in or actively involved in terrorist financing.320 
F.   Going Forward—U.S. Approach 
It would be an easy stretch for the U.S. to recognize U.K. charities, 
and perhaps even those of other EU Member States, as having 
comparable oversight to U.S. charities and therefore to allow U.S. 
donors to receive deductions for contributions made to them. The 
U.K.’s regulation of its sector in some ways vastly exceeds the 
regulation present in the U.S. In its most recent MER, the U.K. 
received, in terms of R.8 (formerly SR.VIII), the same rating of 
Largely Compliant as Canada did, which is just one mark lower than 
the U.S. received.321 However, unlike Canada’s rating, the U.K.’s 
rating was based on the absence of a system for providing for 
registration, transparency, and supervision of charities formed in a 
certain part of it, namely Northern Ireland.322 In other words, the 
charities associated with the rest of the U.K. were deemed to have met 
the standards associated with R.8. If the U.S. chose to acknowledge 
U.K. charities as valid vehicles for the contribution of U.S. charitable 
funds, it could exclude charities in Northern Ireland until the issue is 
remedied. To not allow deductible contributions to U.K. charities, 
which are in form similar to, and at times more effective than, U.S. 
charities leads to a more ineffective charitable market. Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                 
 318. Id. at 256, 261. 
 319. Compare THIRD U.S. MER SUMMARY, supra note 163, at 16, and THIRD CANADA MER, supra 
note 310, at 259, 300, with MEXICO MER, supra note 310, at 262, 324. 
 320. MEXICO MER, supra note 310, at 261–62, 336–37. 
 321. THIRD U.K. MER, supra note 167, at 288; THIRD U.S. MER SUMMARY, supra note 163, at 16. 
 322. THIRD U.K. MER, supra note 167, at 288. 
50
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 2
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol31/iss2/2
2015] THE CHARITABLE DEDUCTION GAMES 339 
the IMF’s findings on countries’ compliance with FATF 
Recommendations from 2004-2011, evinced that the U.K. ranked 
higher (35.33) than the U.S. (34.33) in terms of overall compliance.323 
Interestingly, even though Canada and the U.K. received a rating of 
Largely Compliant on their respective MERs, Canada’s overall IMF 
score (25) was significantly lower than the U.K.’s.324 Mexico’s overall 
score (24.67) was even lower than Canada’s.325 A comprehensive 
approach whereby the U.S. examines the rating of a country in terms 
of R.8 and its overall IMF rating could be used to determine which 
countries’ charities are eligible to receive U.S. tax deductible 
contributions. Given the procedures that would need to be put in place 
for such an agreement to be made, the U.S. may prefer only to extend 
this treatment to EU Member States who have received a rating of at 
least Largely Compliant in terms of R.8 and a minimum overall IMF 
rating equal to at least that of the U.S., which currently is 34.33. An 
examination of the rigorous approach associated with the FATF’s 
rating system and the IMF’s findings lends credence to this thought. 
CONCLUSION: THE PATHWAY TO CHANGE 
To create an efficient charitable market, the U.S. must unshackle the 
hands of the giver to enable greater ease in cross-border charitable 
giving. As this article has shown, there are solutions to the problems 
associated with changing the law in this regard. First, there is a way to 
ensure that the floodgates are not opened too widely for U.S. 
investment in non-U.S. charities. The U.S. should define the range of 
acceptable charitable purposes based upon pressing, agreed-upon 
goals that foster global good. The UN Millennium Development Goals 
represent such aims.326 Moreover, as expert economists and advisers 
have noted, funding for the UN MDGs has been deficient, and the U.S. 
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may assist with correcting it through declaring the UN MDGs 
acceptable charitable purposes for eligible non-U.S. charities.327 
Second, the U.S. must provide a standardized charitable form for such 
non-U.S. charities, so they will have certainty in terms of receiving a 
U.S. stamp of approval. A standardized charitable form will cut down 
on inefficient spending to meet tax and administrative requirements 
specific to the U.S.328 The EU standardized charitable form proposed 
for EU Member States in 2012 (i.e., the FE Statute) is instructive and 
may be modified to fit U.S. standards.329 Following this reasoning, 
charities formed under the FE Statute, with the appropriate 
modifications, should be acceptable to the U.S.330 Finally, the U.S. 
may ensure that unshackled investment does not end up financing 
terrorism. Contrary to conventional thinking, the IRS has done an 
inadequate job of monitoring the financing activity of U.S. charities,331 
and a U.S. decision to relinquish some of its monitoring (in the context 
of non-U.S. charities) would lead to more collaborative oversight 
throughout the global charitable sector. The FATF serves as a premier 
global monitor of its member countries’ ability to prevent terrorist 
financing.332 Accordingly, the U.S. may rely on its requirements, 
subject to modifications, and its ratings of various countries’ 
compliance. 
There is every reason to believe that a modified version of the 
existing FATF requirements could be applied to non-U.S. charities 
with satisfactory FATF ratings and proper form. These non-U.S. 
charities then could be placed on an IRS foreign donor list entitling 
donors to them to receive a U.S. tax deduction.333 The U.S. should start 
with U.K. and other EU charities (formed under the terms of the FE 
statute and with high FATF ratings) and require modification as 
outlined.334 The U.S. has the opportunity to take a historic lead in 
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establishing an efficient charitable market and in doing so help to 
alleviate some of the most urgent global ills in the process. Once the 
hands of givers are unshackled through a change in U.S. cross-border 
giving law, the U.S. may direct, guide, and protect such investment to 
ensure it ends up in the best place possible, in its most productive use 
for humanity and the world. 
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